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Abstract 
This paper analyzes persuasive advertising and pricing in oligopoly if firms sell differentiated 
products and consumers have heterogenous social attitudes towards the consumption by 
others. Deriving product demand from primitives, we show that the demand-enhancing 
effect of persuasive advertising varies across consumers and increases in the average degree 
of conformity. In equilibrium, both quality and cost leaders choose higher advertising 
intensities and charge higher prices than their competitors. In addition, we show that an 
increase in the average degree of conformity among consumers reinforces asymmetries 
between firms. 
Keywords 
Advertising, social attitude, consumption externality, quality 
JEL Classification 
D11, D43, L15, L21, M37 1 Introduction
Conventional theory posits that the impact of persuasive advertising on the
willingness to pay does not vary across consumers.1 Johnson and Myatt (2006)
refer to this type of advertising as “pure hype,” noting that persuasive adver-
tising shifts out the demand curve. However, both casual observation and em-
pirical evidence suggest that there is a “diversity of consumer behavior toward
advertising” (Gabszewicz et al., 2004, 62).2 This raises the natural question of
how to reconcile the theory of persuasive advertising with the empirical evi-
dence.
This paper proposes a model of persuasive advertising which allows the
impact on the willingness to pay to vary across consumers. In line with con-
ventional advertising theory, we start from the presumption that persuasive
advertising shifts out the demand curve by increasing the perceived quality
of the product. This demand shift is the direct of effect of persuasive adver-
tising. To account for the fact that consumers often care about the choices of
others (Clark and Oswald, 1998; Sobel, 2005), we further introduce consump-
tion externalitiesinto the analysis. Speciﬁcally, we assume that consumers have
heterogenous “social attitudes” towards the consumption by others. Some con-
sumers are “conformists” who derive a positive extra utility from the fact that
other consumers buy the same product. The remaining consumers are “exclu-
sivists” whose utility is negatively affected by others buying the same prod-
uct. Since persuasive advertising shifts out the demand curve, it also affects
the extra utility consumers derive from the consumption externality. This is
the indirect effect of persuasive advertising which systematically varies across
consumers. Adding up the direct and the indirect effect, we ﬁnd that the im-
pact of persuasive advertising on the willingness to pay generally varies across
consumers.
Wedevelopourkeyargumentthattheeffectofpersuasiveadvertisingvaries
across consumers in two steps. We begin by considering an oligopoly model
in reduced form where the intensity of persuasive advertising is chosen before
1See Bagwell (2007) for an authoritative survey of the advertising literature; von der
Fehr and Stevik (1998) discuss various approaches towards modeling persuasive advertising.
Rotemberg (2010) studies the role of persuasion in salesperson-customer interactions.
2For instance, for platform markets, some papersassume that consumers dislike advertising
while others impose that there are both advertising avoiders and advertising lovers (see, e.g.,
Anderson and Coate, 2005; Gabszewicz et al., 2005; Peitz and Valletti, 2008). However, Kaiser
and Song (2009) ﬁnd little evidence for consumers disliking advertising.
2ﬁrms interact in the product market. We show that, if demand depends on
a parameter capturing consumption externalities, the intensity of persuasive
advertising will generally be affected by consumption externalities. However,
to learn more about the impact of persuasive advertising on individual con-
sumers’ willingness to pay, it is necessary to put more structure on the model.
Weconsideranoligopoly modelwhere productdemandisconstructed from
primitives. Speciﬁcally, we assume that products are horizontally and verti-
cally differentiated and sellers compete in persuasive advertising and pricing.
Consumers have unit demand, and their product valuations are additively sep-
arable in the intrinsic consumption utility and the extrinsic utility derived from
the consumption externality. To capture consumer heterogeneity, we let the
taste for the preferred product variant and the social attitude vary across con-
sumers.3 The distribution of social attitudes determines the average degree of
conformity in the population.
The timing of the model is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms simultane-
ously choose their advertising intensity and thus the perceived quality of their
respective products. In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously set prices. In
the third stage, consumers form rational expectations about the demands for
the products and make their purchase decisions.
We derive the following main results. First, product demand depends on
the weight of the extrinsic utility (relative to the intrinsic consumption utility)
and the average degree of conformity in the population. Nevertheless, product
demand has the usual properties regarding prices and perceived qualities (i.e.,
it is decreasing in own price and increasing in own quality, and vice versa for
the competitor’s price andquality). Second, weﬁnd thatthe demand-enhancing
effect of persuasive advertising varies across consumers. The result follows
from the consumers’ heterogenous social attitudes towards the consumption
by others. Aggregating across consumers, we ﬁnd that the demand-enhancing
effectof persuasive advertising increasesin the average degree ofconformity in
the population. Third, we characterize equilibrium advertising and pricing and
show that both quality and cost leaders choose higher advertising intensities
and charge higher prices than their competitor. This asymmetry stem from
differences in the ﬁrms’ quality-cost margins. Increases in the average degree
of conformity, the relative weight of the extrinsic utility, and the persuasive
power of advertising all reinforce the asymmetry in equilibrium.
3We also allow for “standard”consumers who are agnostic about the consumption of others
and therefore derive an extrinsic utility of zero from the consumption externality.
3Our paper makes two contributions to the behavioral industrial organiza-
tion literature.4 First, by introducing social attitudes into a persuasive advertis-
ing model, we provide a consistent explanation for the diversity of consumer
behavior towards persuasive advertising. In doing so, we add to the scant liter-
ature on oligopoly models with consumption externalities, which has focused
on pricing alone (Grilo et al., 2001; Amaldoss and Jain, 2005).5 Our analysis
suggests that the impact of persuasive advertising on consumers is similar to
informative advertising if consumers have heterogeneous social attitudes. The
reasonisthatconsumerswithdifferentsocial attitudesderivedifferentextrinsic
utility from consumption externalities. Second, we add to the literature on hor-
izontal and vertical product differentiation (see, e.g., Vandenbosch and Wein-
berg, 1995; Anderson and de Palma, 2001; Baake and Boom, 2001). Our analysis
demonstrates that heterogeneous social attitudes may reinforce the asymmetry
in market shares, prices, and advertising intensities, which typically emerges
in these models.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the
limitations of the reduced-form approach and motivates our analytical frame-
work. Section 3 introduces our model. Section 4 derives consumer demand,
studies the effects of persuasive advertising, and characterizes the equilibrium
along with its comparative statics properties. Section 5 concludes.
2 Backdrop
To shed light on the role of social attitudes for persuasive advertising, it is nat-
ural to start from a reduced-form approach. The simplest setting is a duopoly
model where one ﬁrm, say ﬁrm 1, can choose its advertising intensity a in a
stage proceeding product market rivalry. Suppose ﬁrm i’s reduced-form de-
mand is given by Di(p,a,µ), where p = (p1,p2) is the price vector and the
parameter µ > 0 captures the importance of consumption externalities. Denot-
ing advertising outlays by φ(a), ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁt in the advertising
4Ellison (2006) provides a survey of this literature.
5A related strand of the literature has focused on network externalities (see Farrell and
Klemperer, 2007, for a survey). There are two key differences to this strand of the literature.
First, network externalities stem from technical characteristics of the product, while consump-
tion externalities relate to social attitudes of consumers. Second, network externalities are typ-
ically positive, whereas consumers may well have negative perceptions of consumption exter-
nalities.





1(a,µ)   D1(p
∗(a,µ),a,µ) − φ(a),
where the asterisk indicates optimal choices in the subsequent pricing stage.
Standard comparative statics results show that consumption externalities
affect the equilibrium advertising intensity a∗(µ) = argmaxa π∗
1(a,µ) provided
that da∗
dµ  = 0. It is thus immediate that consumption externalities generally af-
fect proﬁt-maximizing advertising. However, to learn more about the impact of
persuasive advertising on individual consumers’ willingness to pay, it is neces-
sary to consider an oligopoly model where product demand can be constructed
from primitives.
3 Model
We consider a model where ﬁrms choose advertising intensities and set prices
for products that are horizontally and vertically differentiated. The key feature
of this model is that consumers have heterogenous social attitudes regarding
the consumption choices of others.
3.1 Firms
There are two single-product ﬁrms. Both ﬁrms i = 1,2 choose their advertising
intensity ai and sell their product at price pi. Horizontal differentiation is ` a la
Hotelling, and we assume that the ﬁrms are located at the extremes of the prod-
uct spectrum at x1 = 0 and x2 = 1, respectively. Vertical differentiation captures
the notion that advertising affects the perceived product quality. Speciﬁcally,
for each product i, perceived product quality
θi = qi + ωai (1)
is an index weighting intrinsic quality qi and persuasive advertising ai. The
weighting factor ω > 0 reﬂects the persuasive power of advertising.
The advertising intensity isendogenously determined. For convenience, we
suppose that advertising costs are quadratic and given by k(ai) = βa2
i, where
β > 0 is an exogenous parameter. The marginal cost of output with intrinsic
quality qi is ci ≥ 0.
53.2 Consumers
Consumers have unit demand. Their valuation Vi of product i reﬂects both
intrinsic utility vi and extrinsic utility ei.6 In line with Bernheim (1994) and
Clark and Oswald (1998), we assume that Vi is additively separable in its utility
components, that is,
Vi = vi + µei, (2)
where the parameter µ > 0 indicates the importance of extrinsic relative to
intrinsic utility.
Intrinsic Utility. A consumer buying product i derives intrinsic utility
vi = θi − τ |x − xi| + m − pi, (3)
where θi is the perceived quality, x ∈ [0,1] is the consumer’s most preferred
product variant, and m is income. The parameter τ measures the consumer’s
sensitivity to horizontal mismatch |x − xi|.7
Extrinsic Utility. A consumer’s extrinsic utility depends on the number of
consumers buying the same product. In line with Karni and Schmeidler (1990),
we capture this number by the ﬁrms’ expected equilibrium market shares and
deﬁne extrinsic utility as
ei = σ|y − xi|,
where y ∈ (0,1) denotes the expected demand (market share) of ﬁrm 1 and the
parameter σ captures a consumer’s social attitude.
There is a continuum of social attitudes σ ∈ [σ,σ], with σ < 0 < σ. Fol-
lowing Grilo et al. (2001) and Amaldoss and Jain (2005), consumers with σ > 0
are conformists who like other consumers buying the same product, while con-
sumers with σ < 0 are exclusivists who dislike others buying the same product.
Notice that the absolute value of σ reﬂects the intensity of a consumer’s social
attitude.
Consumer Characteristics. Individual consumers are characterized by their
most preferred product variant x and their social attitude σ. These character-
istics are drawn independently from uniform distributions over the intervals
6Vi reﬂects the consumer’s complete experience of the product and therefore has the inter-
pretation of brand value in the marketing literature (Keller and Lehmann, 2006).
7In spatial models, τ has the interpretation of transportation costs.
6[0,1] and [σ,σ], respectively. Independence implies that characteristics are dis-
tributed according to the bivariate uniform distribution
f(X,Σ)(x,σ) =
(
(σ − σ)−1 if (x,σ) ∈ T
0 otherwise
on the rectangular space T ≡ [0,1] × [σ,σ]. The marginal distribution of so-
cial attitudes has expectation E[σ] = (σ + σ)/2, which is labeled the “average
degree of conformity.” Individual consumer characteristics are private knowl-
edge, and ﬁrms only know the distribution f(X,Σ)(x,σ).
Below, we will refer to τ − µE[σ] as the sensitivity to horizontal mismatch.
This expression generalizes the standard notion of the sensitivity to horizontal
mismatch to our setting with social attitudes. Following Laffont et al. (1998),
we view (τ −µE[σ])−1 as an index of substitutability between the two products.
It is natural to assume that this index is positive, which requires E[σ] < τ/µ.
3.3 Timing
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms simultaneously choose their advertising intensity ai and
hence their perceived product quality θi. In the second stage, ﬁrms simulta-
neously set prices pi. In the third stage, consumers form rational expectations
about demand y and make their purchase decisions.
4 Analysis
In this section, we derive the demand functions, study the interaction of social
attitudes and persuasive advertising, and derive the product market equilib-
rium.
4.1 Demand
We now derive product demands Di (p,θ) as a function of prices p = (p1,p2)
and perceived qualities θ = (θ1,θ2). For convenience, we assume that the mar-
ket is covered and impose that consumers have rational expectations about y
(Katz and Shapiro, 1985).
To construct the set of types B(y) who buy product 1 conditional on the
belief y, we solve the indifference condition V1 = V2 to obtain the cut-off value
x(σ|y) =

























Figure 1: Demands for y > 1
2 (in Panel A, the shaded area indicates types that
buy from ﬁrm 1) and individual demand changes when the perceived quality
of product 1 changes (in Panel B).
For given y, the cut-off value x(σ|y) traces out the points of indifference in
the type space T when going from the most exclusivist attitude σ to the most
conformist attitude σ. The slope of this “indifference curve” is determined by







which is positive for y > 1/2 and negative for y < 1/2. For y > 1/2, the
indifference curve is upwards-sloping because conformists can compensate the
disutility from horizontal mismatch with extra utility from the consumption












This set is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1.
Since consumers form rational expectations, the belief y regarding ﬁrm 1’s









that is, the expected demand y for product 1 must be equal to the actual de-
mand (given y).
8Proposition 1 (Demand). Suppose x(σ|y) ∈ (0,1) for all social attitudes σ and









Three remarks on Proposition 1 are in order. First, the condition on x(σ|y)
requires that there is an indifferent consumer for every social attitude. Intu-
itively, this allows us to focus on a setting where the horizontal mismatch dom-
inates the utility from the consumption externality even for some consumers
with the most extreme social attitudes.
Second, the demand Di (p,θ) is reminiscent of demand functions in stan-
dard Hotelling models in two ways: It has the usual comparative statics prop-
erties regarding prices and qualities (i.e., it is increasing in own quality and de-
creasing in own price, and vice versa for the competitor’s quality and price).
Further, asymmetries in market shares stem only from differences in quali-
ties or prices. Notice, in particular, that Di (p,θ) > Dj (p,θ) if and only if
θi − pi > θj − pj. Using terminology introduced by Anderson and de Palma
(2001), ﬁrm i has higher demand than ﬁrm j if and only if it has a higher
“quality-price margin.”
Third, Proposition 1 shows that social attitudes affect demand through their
impact on the sensitivity to horizontal mismatch τ −µE[σ]. Moreover, it shows
that the size of this impact depends on the importance of consumption exter-
nalities and the average degree of conformity only.
4.2 Effects of Advertising
Standard advertising models ignore the impact of social attitudes on demand.
In our model, social attitudes have an important impact on demand and there-
fore on the demand-enhancing effect of advertising at both the individual and
the aggregate level.
The individual effects of persuasive advertising are best illustrated using
Figure 1 (Panel B). Consider an increase in ﬁrm i’s advertising intensity from ai
to a′
i > ai. This leads to higher perceived quality θi, which induces a shift of the
“indifference curve” to the right. Since quality has a demand-enhancing effect,
the belief y is updated accordingly (i.e., y increases to, say, y′), which leads to
a clockwise rotation of the indifference curve around the point x(0,y′). This
9rotation is generated by heterogeneous social attitudes: While all consumers
equally beneﬁt from the increase in intrinsic utility, the extrinsic utility of con-
formists and exclusivists is affected differently. The demand-enhancing effect
of a quality increase is reinforced for conformists (who beneﬁt from an increase
in the demand for product 1) and weakened for exclusivists (who suffer from
an increase in the demand for product 1). Therefore, conformists are more
attracted to the heavily advertised product than standard consumers (with
σ = 0), whereas exclusivists are less attracted than standard consumers.
The next result highlights the diversity of consumer behavior towards per-
suasive advertising.
Proposition 2 (Individual Effect). Suppose that ai increases to a′
i > ai and let y′ >
y denote the corresponding beliefs. Then, the demand-enhancing effect for consumers
















This result shows that persuasive advertising has a direct and an indirect
effect on individual consumers. The direct effect does not depend on σ and
is thus constant across consumers (which is reﬂected in a parallel shift of the





ai d˜ ai in contrast varies across
consumers. It reinforces the direct effect for conformists and may dampen or
dominate the direct effect for exclusivists (which is reﬂected in a rotation of the
indifference curve). The proposition further shows that the average degree of
conformity E[σ] inﬂuences only the indirect effect of advertising.
Proposition 2 is related to Johnson and Myatt (2006). Their key idea is that
individual consumers may be affected differently by informative advertising:
Some are discouraged from purchasing, while others are encouraged. In our
setting, the impact of advertising also varies across consumers despite its per-
suasive nature. Our result follows from the existence of consumption external-
ities rather than information transmission through advertising.
Our next result sums up the individual demand-enhancing effects across
consumers to obtain the aggregate demand-enhancing effect of persuasive ad-
vertising.
10Proposition 3 (Aggregate Effect). Consider a marginal increase in ﬁrm i’s adver-
tising intensity ai. Then, the aggregate demand-enhancing effect of persuasive adver-
tising
∂Di(p,θ)
∂ai results from adding up the individual effects across consumers. It is




Proposition 3 shows that an increase in the average degree of conformity
makes persuasive advertising more effective. The exception is the case where
the distribution of social attitudes is symmetric around zero (E[σ] = 0). In this
case the sensitivity to horizontal mismatch is determined solely by τ, as in the
standard Hotelling model.
4.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the
two-stage game and characterize its comparative statics properties.
Pricing and Advertising
Given any ﬁrst-stage qualities θ, ﬁrm i maximizes its product market proﬁt and
chooses its price pi so as to maximize πi(p) = (pi − ci)Di(p,θ), which yields
pi(θ) =
3(τ − µE[σ]) + (θi − θj) + 2ci + cj
3
. (7)
Prices have the natural property that they are increasing in the consumers’ sen-
sitivity to horizontal mismatch, because products are perceived as being less
substitutable. All else equal, equilibrium prices are decreasing in the average
degree of conformity E[σ], as emphasized by Grilo et al. (2001) and Amaldoss
and Jain (2005).
Firm i’s product market proﬁt πi(θ) = (pi(θ) − ci)Di(θ) can be expressed as
πi(θ) =




Substituting the perceived qualities θ from (1) into πi(θ) and accounting for the
cost of advertising, ﬁrm i’s problem is to maxai πi(a) − βa2
i, where a = (a1,a2)
is the vector of advertising intensities.
The next proposition characterizes the unique subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium (SPNE) in which both ﬁrms engage in advertising.8
8The Appendix gives the conditions that ensure existence and uniqueness.
11Proposition 4 (Equilibrium). In the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium where both











(qi − ci) − (qj − cj)






i = (τ − µE[σ]) + ci +
3β(τ − µE[σ])((qi − ci) − (qj − cj))
9β(τ − µE[σ]) − ω2 . (10)
Proof. See Appendix.
The result indicates that the aggregate advertising intensity is ﬁxed and
given by a∗
1 + a∗
2 = ω/3β. It is ﬁxed because the market size is normalized
to unity, and it depends on the persuasive power of advertising ω and the cost
parameter β only. Thus, advertising necessarily has a business-stealing effect.
Proposition 4 contains two benchmark equilibria as special cases. The ﬁrst
benchmark is the case where the persuasive power of advertising tends to zero.
In this case, advertising has no demand-enhancing effect, so that the ﬁrms
choose not to advertise. Nevertheless, prices are affected by social attitudes,
as in Grilo et al. (2001) and Amaldoss and Jain (2005). The second benchmark
is the case where ﬁrms are symmetric. In this case, social attitudes affect prices
only.
Proposition 4 allows us to make a number of observations (the proofs are
relegated to the Appendix). To this end, we introduce the notion of ﬁrm i’s
“quality-cost margin” qi − ci (Anderson and de Palma, 2001).
Observation 1 (Asymmetric Advertising and Pricing). Suppose ﬁrm i has a
higher quality-cost margin than ﬁrm j. Then, ﬁrm i has a higher advertising inten-
sity and charges a higher price than ﬁrm j.
Observation 1 highlights thatasymmetries in equilibrium advertising inten-
sities and prices are driven by asymmetries in the quality-cost margins of indi-
vidual ﬁrms. The result covers both quality leadership (with equal marginal
costs) and cost-leadership (with equal intrinsic product qualities) as special
cases. Note that both quality leaders and cost leaders invest more in adver-
tising and sell at higher prices than their competitors.
Intuitively, Observation 1 follows from the existence of demand-markup
complementarities (Athey and Schmutzler, 2001) in the product market, as the
next result illustrates.
12Observation 2 (Asymmetric Proﬁts). Suppose ﬁrm i has a higher quality-cost mar-
gin than ﬁrm j. Then, ﬁrm i has a higher markup and a higher demand than ﬁrm j,
and hence earns a higher product market proﬁt. Firm i also earns a higher equilibrium
net proﬁt.
This observation shows that a ﬁrm with a higher quality-cost margin has a
stronger incentive to invest in advertising, because the effect is more valuable
thanks to a higher markup. In addition, it has a stronger incentive to increase
the price, since a larger markup is more valuable thanks to larger demand.
Given that equilibrium demand and markup are both larger for a ﬁrm with a
higher quality-cost margin, equilibrium proﬁts are also higher.9
The next observation characterizes the relationship between the ﬁrm’s equi-
librium advertising intensity and price.
Observation 3 (Price-Advertising Relation). Firm i’s price and advertising inten-
sity are positively related.
The price-advertising relationship is at the core of the advertising literature.
The persuasive view of advertising holds that heavily advertised products are
more expensive than less advertised products due to the consumers’ higher
willingness to pay (Bagwell, 2007). Observation 3 suggests that the positive
relationship between the equilibrium price and advertising intensity is robust
to the introduction of social attitudes.
Comparative Statics
We now provide some interesting comparative statics results of our analysis.
Our focus is on marginal changes in the average degree of conformity and the
persuasive power of advertising. We start with changes in the average degree
of conformity.
Observation 4 (Social Attitudes). Suppose ﬁrm i has a higher quality-cost margin
than ﬁrm j. Then, a marginal increase in the average degree of conformity reinforces
asymmetries in equilibrium advertising intensities and prices.
This result shows that the distribution of market shares is more asymmetric
when ﬁrms face a conformist population (E[σ] > 0) rather than an exclusivist
population (E[σ] ≤ 0).
9This result is related to earlier work by Anderson and de Palma (2001). The key difference
to this paper is that our analysis allows for social attitudes among consumers.
13Before proceeding, we note that the comparative statics effects of changes in
µ, the parameter capturing the relative importance of extrinsic utility, are quali-
tatively the same as those of changes in E[σ]. Intuitively, the result follows from
the fact that both variables affect demand, and hence the equilibrium quanti-
ties, only through their impact on the sensitivity to horizontal mismatch.
Next, we analyze how the persuasive power of advertising affects equilib-
rium pricing and advertising intensities.
Observation 5 (Persuasive Power). Suppose ﬁrmihas a higherquality-costmargin
than ﬁrm j. Then, a marginal increase in the persuasive power of advertising reinforces
asymmetries in equilibrium advertising intensities and prices.
This ﬁnding shows that the equilibrium advertising intensities of asymmet-
ric ﬁrms are affected differently. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm with the higher quality-
cost margin (and higher initial advertising) increases advertising, whereas the
smaller ﬁrm with the lower quality-cost margin may increase or decrease10
advertising. In any case, the larger ﬁrm increases advertising more than the
smaller ﬁrm, so that equilibrium advertising becomes more asymmetric.
As to prices, we ﬁnd that an increase in the persuasive power of adver-
tising reinforces the asymmetry in equilibrium behavior: The larger ﬁrm with
the higher quality-cost margin (and hence the higher price) increases the price,
whereas the smaller ﬁrm (with the lower price) reduces the price.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined persuasive advertising and pricing in an oligopoly
model with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The key feature of
this model is that a consumer’s product valuation depends both on persua-
sive advertising and her (unobservable) individual social attitude towards the
consumption of the product by others.
We have derived the following key results. First, the demand for each prod-
uct depends on the weight of the extrinsic utility (relative to the intrinsic con-
sumption utility) and the average degree of conformity in the population. Sec-
ond, the demand-enhancing effect of persuasive advertising varies across con-
sumers. The result follows from the consumers’ heterogenous social attitudes
towards the consumption by others. Aggregating across consumers, we have
10Note that a decrease in advertising by the smaller ﬁrm requires a very strong asymmetry
in quality-cost margins, in which case the small ﬁrm can be viewed as being “marginalized.”
14shown that the demand-enhancing effect of persuasive advertising increases
in the average degree of conformity in the population. Third, both quality and
cost leaders choose higher advertising intensities and charge higher prices than
their competitor in equilibrium. Increases in the average degree of conformity,
the relative weight of the extrinsic utility, and the persuasive power of adver-
tising all reinforce the asymmetry in equilibrium.
Our analysis contributes to a scant behavioral industrial organization lit-
erature and suggests several avenues for future research. First, it would be
interesting to examine settings where sellers may strategically manipulate the
social attitudes of consumers (which are exogenous in our setting). Second,
it would be natural to extend the analysis to other distributions of consumer
characteristics (and higher-dimensional tastes). Third, it would be desirable to
allow for the possibility of price discrimination across consumers. We hope to
address these issues in future research.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Fix y and deﬁne x = x(σ,y) and x = x(σ,y),
respectively, and recall that each point in B ⊂ T has density (σ − σ)
−1. Under
the assumption that x(σ|y) ∈ (0,1)forall social attitudes σ andbeliefsy ∈ (0,1),
actual demand can be expressed as (x + x)/2. Letting ξ ≡ τ+(θ1−θ2)−(p1−p2)
and using (4) we obtain
x =
ξ + µσ(2y − 1)
2τ
and x =
ξ + µσ(2y − 1)
2τ
,
respectively. As E[σ] = (σ + σ)/2, we can thus express actual demand as
ξ + µE[σ](2y − 1)
2τ
,
which has to be equal to expected demand y under the rational expectations
assumption. Solving the ﬁxed-point condition in (5) yields
y (p,θ) =
τ − µE[σ] + (θ1 − p1) − (θ2 − p2)
2(τ − µE[σ])
. (A.1)
By construction, D1 (p,θ) = y (p,θ) and D2 (p,θ) = 1 − y(p,θ), which es-
tablishes the result.
15PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Write the change in demand for consumers



























Notice that (A.1) deﬁnes y as a continuously differentiable function of ai, and
denote this function by y ≡ φ(ai). Using integration by substitution, the second





















where the last equality makes use of (4). Further substituting from (4) the ex-












which establishes the result.













Dividing the preceding equation by
R a′
i
ai d˜ ai = a′















which completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: For convenience, we let ˆ τ ≡ τ−µE[σ] and recall
that the (inverse) substitutability index ˆ τ ≡ τ−µE[σ] is positive by assumption.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problems maxai πi(a)−βa2
i are, in matrix form,
given by
 
−ω2 + 18ˆ τβ ω2







γ + 3ˆ τ
γ − 3ˆ τ
!
, (A.3)
16where γ ≡ q1 − q2 − c1 + c2. The matrix on the LHS of (A.3), call it M, is
invertible if and only if detM  = 0; that is, if and only if 324ˆ τ2β2 − 36ˆ τβω2  = 0.
This condition holds whenever β > ω2/9ˆ τ. The reduced-form proﬁt function is
strictly concave in own advertising ifβ > ω2/18ˆ τ.11 Ifthe invertibility condition
holds, the ﬁrst-order conditions uniquely determine the advertising levels, and










(qi − ci) − (qj − cj)
9βˆ τ − ω2
￿
.
The advertising intensities a∗
i are positive as long as |γ| < (9βˆ τ − ω2)/3β. Sub-
stituting a∗
i into (1) and plugging the θi’s into (7) yields the optimal prices
p
∗
i = ˆ τ + ci +
3βˆ τ ((qi − ci) − (qj − cj))
9βˆ τ − ω2 .
This completes the proof.






ω ((qi − ci) − (qj − cj))
9βˆ τ − ω2 . (A.4)
The invertibility condition (Proposition 4) requires that 9βˆ τ − ω2 > 0. Thus,
ﬁrm i has a higher advertising intensity if and only if it has a higher quality-
cost margin.






6βˆ τ(qi − qj) − (ω2 − 3βˆ τ)ci + (ω2 − 3βˆ τ)cj
9βˆ τ − ω2 . (A.5)
Writethenumerator of(A.5)as(6βˆ τqi − (ω2 − 3βˆ τ)ci)−(6βˆ τqj − (ω2 − 3βˆ τ)cj).
By the hypothesis, (qi − ci)−(qj − cj) > 0. As 9βˆ τ −ω2 > 0, both the numerator
and the denominator of (A.5) are positive. Thus, p∗
i − p∗
j > 0, which completes
the proof.
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 2: The equilibrium markups m∗
i = p∗
i − ci follow
from (10), and they are given by
m
∗
i = ˆ τ
￿
1 +
3β ((qi − ci) − (qj − cj))
9βˆ τ − ω2
￿
.
11Clearly, the invertibility condition is more stringent than the second-order condition.
17Bythe hypothesis and using the invertibility condition (Proposition 4), we have
that m∗
i > m∗
j. Now, plugging the price pi(θ) from (7) into the demand function
as given in (6) yields Di(θ) = (3ˆ τ + (θi − θj) − (ci − cj))/6ˆ τ. Next, from (7), the
markups as a function of θ are given by mi(θ) = (3ˆ τ + (θi − θj) − (ci − cj))/3.
Thus, mi(θ) = 2ˆ τDi(θ), which implies that D∗
i > D∗
j. Moreover, as πi(θ) =
mi(θ)Di(θ), we have that π∗
i > π∗
j. Finally, letting Πi(a) ≡ πi(a) − βa2
i, straight-
















Invoking the hypothesis and the invertibility condition again, we immediately
have that Π∗
i > Π∗
j. This completes the proof.
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 3: Rewrite p∗
i as given in (9) as
p
∗







(qi − ci) − (qj − cj)
2(9βˆ τ − ω2)
￿
− ˆ τ + ci.
Substituting a∗
i from (10) into the preceding equation yields p∗
i = 6βˆ τa∗
i/ω + ci,
which implies a positive relationship between advertising intensities and pric-
ing. This completes the proof.
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 4: Differentiating (A.4) with respect to E[σ] and


























/∂E[σ] > 0, which completes the proof.
Remark: The effects of µ are qualitatively the same as those of E[σ]. The im-
pact on the price gap follows by noting that ∂ˆ τ/∂µ < 0.
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 5: Differentiating (A.4) with respect to ω and us-
ingthe invertibility condition (from Proposition 4)yieldsthat ∂(a∗
i−a∗
j)/∂ω > 0.






/∂ω > 0 establishes the result.
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